Earlier this year, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines reported the current strength of the Maoist
New People’s Army had gone down to 2,000 regular
fighters from its peak of 25,000 in the 1980s.
Of late, the AFP spokesman said the figure
had gone down even further to just 1,500 fighters
spread out in a few guerrilla zones.
Hence, the government had reached strategic victory over the NPA, but not total victory which
would come when the NPA itself would wither on the
vine because of more casualties in the battlefield and
widespread demoralization.
With the vastly reduced NPA armed strength
and presumably its mass base due to battlefield losses
and surrenders, the government could have opted to
go for the jugular, so to speak, and run after the remaining active rebels with hammer and tongs.
But it appears the Marcos Jr. administration
has decided not to further unleash the dogs of war
against the rebels, but to convince them instead to sit
down across the negotiating table to discuss ways to
achieve lasting peace.
The recent agreement in Oslo for the resumption of peace talks between the Philippine government
and the National Democratic Front is a welcome development as it offers the prospect of an end to 55
years of the armed insurgency that has cost no less
than an estimated 40,000 losses on both sides and
resources that could have been spent for economic
development and anti-poverty programs.
The peace process leading to a comprehensive agreement could take time and hit many snags
along the way due to differences in position on key issues.
One possible obstacle to successful political
negotiations would be the lack of a bilateral ceasefire
while the talks are ongoing.
If the fighting in the countryside continues
while the negotiators argue across the table in a foreign venue, that could certainly raise accusations of
bad faith and lack of sincerity by either side.
The Communist Party of the Philippines has
demanded that for the peace talks to resume, the government should release from jail all NDF consultants
and 800 political prisoners, dismantle the National Task
Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, and repeal the designation of the CPP-NPA-NDF as ‘terrorist’
organizations.
Will the government side accede to these immediate demands?
And how would the CPP-NPA-NDF react if
the government asks them to stop the so-called “revolutionary taxation” in areas where the rebels operate,
which the government claims is extortion?
We really don’t kno
